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Abstract  
The paper examined the synergy between Sun Tzu strategic thought with counterinsurgency in Nigeria. The 
paper is purely qualitative in approach and documentary sources were used to at least historically analyze 
available information of the issue discussed. The paper submitted though subject to criticism that Sun Tzu 
thought is a masterpiece in addressing the problem of insurgency in Nigeria. 
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1.1 Introduction 
Nigeria is a conflict prone nation with deep seated multiple crises. Domestic pressures, brought on by ethnic 
cleavages, overpopulation, poverty, mal-administration, environmental degradation, globalization, deteriorating 
social conditions, increasing fragility and decay of governmental institutions, especially those devoted to 
responding to the demands of the citizens, have resulted in violent inter-state conflicts. These have taken the 
form of civil wars, guerrilla wars, separatist movements, and ethnic violence over territory or government (Titus, 
2016). However, in order to address these insecurity or insurgency, the state requires strategic measures to 
eliminate insurgency. This paper adopts Sun Tzu’s strategic thought to discuss how it could be used to curtail 
insurgency in Nigeria. 
Sun Tzu’s theories on strategy are timeless in their utility to both military and civilian theorists. His 
theories, especially his concept of an indirect approach, are as relevant today as they were in C. 500 B. C, more 
so in the context of the renowned interest on international terrorism. For one, conflicts such as terrorism/ 
insurgency require the innovative development of theories, which go beyond the past conventional strategies. As 
the emerging literature on combating terrorism points (Rice, 2006) “we must force ourselves to ways of 
defeating a new enemy, one that is generally unseen, is driven ideologically, does not seek a set battle, and is like 
no other faced before”. 
Sun Tzu is generally understood to be a Chinese General who lived over 2,400 years ago, at roughly 
the same time as Confucius. Raised in a family of army officers, Sun Tzu became familiar with, and eventually 
expert in military affairs. Historians are generally agreed that he led, and was successful in a number of military 
campaigns in the region currently known as the Anhui Province. His precise dates of birth and death are not 
known, but it is known that the state of Wu, under whose sovereign he served, became a dominant power at that 
time. Since then, it has become standard practice for Chinese military chiefs to familiarize themselves with Sun 
Tzu's writing (Wikipedia Source, 2015). 
Sun Tzu treats war just as one of the many political instruments that political and national leaders can 
use in order to fulfill political aims. In Chinese philosophical traditions, emphasis on the minimum use of force 
and the advice of deploying arms only when necessary. Sun Tzu’s “New Wars” thinking, a school of thought 
particularly committed in analyzing and understanding why the “old” strategic paradigm, based on conventional 
military superiority, doesn’t work in civil war, counterinsurgency or against terrorism. According to Sun Tzu, 
contemporary conflicts are characterized by episodes of violent political mobilization promoted by “groups 
identified in terms of ethnicity, religion, or tribe”. 
For example, The Art of War has been described as a “revolutionary text” because it was the “first 
handbook that directly linked war making to the art of government”. The different conception on the nature of 
war explained by Sun Tzu provides an approach which “emphasizes stratagem and manoeuvre over firepower 
and recognizes that the decisive battlefield lies in the political will of the opponent, the hearts and minds of its 
citizens.” Indeed, Sun Tzu’s ideal victory doesn’t involve any military or epic battle but it is articulated in the 
main idea of neutralizing the enemy’s strategy and avoiding the use of military forces.  
Accordingly, Sun Tzu recommends setting this kind of strategy without any publicity; otherwise it 
would compel the enemy to respond. In this way, as McCready underlines, Sun Tzu “offers a way for weaker 
forces to defeat those more powerful” currently; international terrorist organizations are widely embedded in the 
concept of ‘weaker forces’ against powerful state actors as the US. Meilinger states that the influence and the 
legacy of the “old” paradigm, focused on “decisive battle and bloodshed, explained the failure of the US military 
mission in Iraq by deploying a large invasion force. 
 
1.2 Sun Tzu’s Strategic Thought 
Sun Tzu’s core assumptions are most easily described by organizing them into main themes: Fundamentals; 
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Command and Control; Important Strategies and Methods of Warfare; and Tactical Principles. These four 
themes address both a direct and an indirect method to warfare, but Sun Tzu stressed that defeating your enemy 
indirectly was the greatest virtue because it husbanded your resources while attacking your foes’ central 
strengths. Three key fundamentals underlie Sun Tzu: one was that warfare was the greatest affair of state; the 
second stressed the criticality of accurate intelligence, analysis and planning; and the last focused on correctly 
setting strategic objectives and the methods to attain them. He believed that “the highest realization of warfare is 
to attack the enemy’s plans; and the lowest is to attack their fortified cities”. Whenever possible, victory should 
be achieved through diplomatic coercion, disrupting the enemy’s alliances, thwarting plans, and frustrating its 
strategy. 
The development of strategies and the methods of warfare comprise the third theme. Here, the ideas of 
deception, terrain, strategic power, and the use of indirect tactics stand out. Sun Tzu stressed that by selecting the 
most advantageous terrain, or conversely avoiding the poorest terrain, in conjunction with deceiving the enemy 
of your true intentions will cause the enemy to make fatal errors thus giving a commander the strategic and 
tactical advantage. The ideas of strategic and indirect power relate to the effective use of all elements of power 
that a state controls; including military, economic and diplomatic power, to influence the person’s will and build 
alliances. Use of these powers alone or together in creative ways will give the commander the decisive 
advantage. 
 
1.3 Sun Tzu and Intelligence 
Throughout The Art of War, Sun Tzu emphasizes the importance of information. According to Sun Tzu, all 
warfare, on the strategic and the tactical level, is based on deception and surprise, and therefore on intelligence 
(Sun Tzu, 1986). Sun Tzu argues that continuous use of information about the enemy’s strategy (political goal, 
possible alliances etc.) and tactical capacities (number and types of troops, war machinery, resources etc.) is the 
only effective way to exploit the enemy’s weaknesses, and should therefore form the basis for all military 
planning (Sun Tzu, 1986). Critics have argued that Sun Tzu relies excessively on intelligence, thereby making 
surprise and deception a panacea (Handel, 2005). Plans that ensure victory require intelligence. Intelligence is 
about the enemy’s strengths, weaknesses, troop dispositions, morale, resources of men and material, strategic 
reserves, etc. In other words, knowledge is power and thus denial of information or intelligence is also a power.  
The bulk of this power is to be exercised before battle is joined for it to lead to any meaningful success or victory. 
For Sun Tzu, the ideal victory is winning without fighting but using extensive deception, in order to convince the 
enemy’s forces to yield. Additionally, it may be asked whether Sun Tzu’s belief that reliable information is 
obtainable and can enable accurate forecasts (Handel, 2005) contradicts his idea of the infinite possible 
developments of war, which was outlined above.  
However, the importance of intelligence in contemporary war should not be dismissed on these 
grounds. Intelligence, surprise and deception do play an important role in modern warfare. During the Persian 
Gulf War, for example, Saddam Hussein’s loss of air reconnaissance allowed the US and its allies to successfully 
conduct deception tactics, which, in additional to the overall supremacy of the US Army, played a role in the 
swift defeat of the Iranian military forces (Finlan, 2003). 
Another insight provided by Sun Tzu’s thought on intelligence in regard to understanding 
contemporary war is more vague and indirect. Sun Tzu was aware of the fact that intelligence and information 
accumulation was a highly complex and difficult task. The chapter on the Use of Spies, where Sun Tzu writes 
about deception, counter-deception and the counter-measures corresponding to counter-deception, clearly 
reflects this complexity. When one takes into account Sun Tzu’s empirical world, his thoughts on the complexity 
of information gathering can be seen in a more insightful light. Sun Tzu’s political world consisted of mainly 
two actors: Emperors of Chinese states, and barbarian rulers (Kane, 2007). The chapter on tactics indicates that 
the vast majority of direct military confrontation took place on the battlefield (Sun Tzu, 1986). This is in contrast 
to the complexity of contemporary conflicts.  
However, conflicts today often include a great variety of actors, all with different kinds of motives and 
strategies (states, warlords, terrorists, security firms, criminal organizations etc.), as well as different kinds of 
warfare (conventional tactics, guerilla warfare, terrorist attacks etc.). Thus one must assume that the realization 
of adequate information is very difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. Therefore, Sun Tzu’s idea of complexity 
of information can help to explain why strong states misjudge certain situations and underestimate the political 
and military capacities of non-state actors, consequently applying inept strategies, which cause them to lose 
asymmetrical conflicts. 
To this end, the role of intelligence as a strategy, Hendel asserts that “Sun Tzu’s generals rely heavily 
on the work of spies and agents in order to secure victory with the least possible expenses and bloodshed”, 
suggesting that this aspect of warfare is one the most significant even for assuring an effective deception. As a 
matter of fact, Sun Tzu wrote an entire chapter about ‘Using Spies’, in which he listed five different kinds of 
them (local, inward, converted, doomed and surviving spies) and described their most important tasks and aims, 
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such as gaining the deepest and the widest knowledge of the enemy.  
Similarly, Al-Qaeda has created “a highly sophisticated network of spies and human intelligence-
gathering sources throughout the world”. Such a system impressively resembles to the one suggested by Sun Tzu 
given that, as Gunaratna reports, it is comprised of three different levels of spies: “two tiers of agents who 
manage agents outside Afghanistan and in the regional nodes. They also cultivate subagents whose primary 
responsibility is penetrating and infiltrating Muslim migrant communities to recruit, gather intelligence and 
conduct operations.” 
As a matter of fact, International Terrorist Association (ITA) like Al-Qaeda employs three conceptual 
pillars which characterize the thought of warfare proposed by Sun Tzu: deception, psychological considerations 
and the role of intelligence. Deception and psychological factors are the heart of warfare because they allow 
manipulating the enemy’s perceptions. Indeed, Sun Tzu perfectly knew that enemies convinced of their 
superiority in terms of capabilities or military resources weren’t attentive to the possibility of being misled. In 
the same way, Al-Qaeda might appear weak or not well-organized but being an international network with links 
in 55 countries and having training camps in many of them, its organizational structure is “such that deception, 
misdirection, secrecy and compartmentalization are heightened” and exploited extensively and successfully. In 
addition, psychological warfare is the direct consequence of deception: attacking enemy soldiers and their related 
citizens through indirect methods is the best way to destroy their morale and create tension inside society. Al-
Qaeda’s tactics are in line with Sun Tzu’s recommendation, its main objective is spreading fear striking target’s 
societies through bombing, hijacking, kidnapping, assassinations and suicide attacks. Doing so, Al-Qaeda aims 
to undermine the overall support for the war effort, the sense of security among citizens and, moreover, it is 
successful in avoiding an open and unbalanced combat with the US. 
 
1.4 Relevance of Sun Tzu on Counterinsurgency in Nigeria 
Deception and winning without fighting is the best skill. Sun Tzu has become the intellectual father of a school 
of warfare that advocates winning by maneuver or by psychologically dislocating the opponent. For example, 
Sun Tzu advocates attacking portions of the enemy with your whole force: “If I am able to determine the 
enemy’s dispositions while at the same time I conceal my own, then I can concentrate and he must divide. And if 
I concentrate while he divides, I can use my entire strength to attack a fraction of his”. 
Sun Tzu’s war fighting maxims span a wide range of strategic, operational, and tactical theories. From 
this list emerge several strategic underlying themes – attacking the enemy’s strategy, knowledge of indirect 
approach, shaping the enemy, man’s role as the decisive factor in war, and the application of intelligence 
gathering activities. All these submissions have been adopted in 20th century warfare, and elaborated upon by 
modern thinkers in strategy decision making. 
From the foregoing, the framework of analysis is a masterpiece in understanding the modus operandi 
of the insurgents from its structures and it influence on Nigerian state. The insurgency is more of terrorism in its 
tactics, which is not different from other major wars that occur in the history of mankind.  
However, for Nigerian state to deal with the situation there is need to adopts Sun Tzu strategy of not 
using much of military operations without thorough preparation rather diplomacy and deception as means to 
conquer the enemy.  Sun Tzu treats war (insurgency) just as one of the many political instruments that political 
and national leaders can use in order to fulfill political aims. For example, the insurgency is good example of the 
political tool used by people to perpetrate their political motives; hence if the government is to overcome this, 
the counterinsurgency strategy of Sun Tzu is useful through negotiation and diplomatic strategy to curtail the 
upsurge of insurgency in the country.   
On intelligence, the theory explains in details that, intelligence and information is very central for 
every counterinsurgency because it gives the security apparatus accurate information about the enemy 
(insurgents) and the success or otherwise is determine by the level of information disseminated. 
To this effect, in warfare, first lay plans which will ensure victory, and then lead your army to battle; if 
you will not begin with stratagem but rely on brute strength alone, victory will no longer be assured." As a 
matter of fact, this theoretical framework can be successful applied to analyze the war on insurgency in Nigeria.  
Indeed, studying The Art of War can be a very efficient way insurgency in Nigeria, which represents 
“a model of Sun Tzu’s principles on indirect warfare”. However, to be more realistically, the defeat of 
insurgency is not entirely possible. This is because of structural injustice and failure of government to address 
the issue of unemployment, education and ethnic cleavages. In order to comply with the so-called ‘second 
paradox of Sun Tzu’ (obtaining success by preserving the enemy from total destruction), it should be noted that, 
“the object of war cannot be total security” but “a better kind of insecurity”. As for the case insurgency it means 
living Nigeria state without attempting to overthrow their political regimes, because the most dangerous peril 
would be to transform the war on insurgency into a war against Islam and resource control. 
However, it is not wrong to argue here that Sun Tzu’s assertion that a skillful strategist should be able 
to subdue the enemy’s army without engaging it is confusing if taken out of context. Sun Tzu was likely 
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referring to deterrence followed by some brilliant manoeuvring on any of the political, moral or economic fronts 
to prevent unnecessary military conflict. An example of the North – South Vietnamese conflict suffices: The 
communists could possibly have achieved the same ultimate objective by other means. One obvious example 
might be to sustain time-consuming guerrilla tactics, while using perceived diplomatic ties with China as 
negotiating leverage with the United States. 
Again, his strategic thought did incomplete analyses and thus provided advice that might be wrong 
depending on the circumstances. For example, Sun Tzu said, “To be certain to take what you attack is to attack a 
place the enemy does not protect”. It is easy to use that quote as an advocacy “indirect approach”. That is, attack 
where the enemy does not expect. The problem is that there is almost always a reason why the enemy does not 
defend a place, and it usually has to do with the limited value of that place. For example, the case of Niger delta 
region of Nigeria, the insurgents may likely concentrate at sensitive terrain where the target resources are located 
and also the insurgent in the northeast protecting only sambisa forest for their interest. 
 
1.5 Conclusion 
Despite the recent military actions in the northeast which supposed to have been defeated, as the recurrent news 
about failed or successful terrorist attacks show us. As a new form of threat which requires a modern strategy to 
be faced, counter-insurgency can be the new security issue in which Sun Tzu’s masterpieces can find a 
pragmatic application. In this case he helps us to understand what terrorism is and how it works on tactical and 
operational levels. At the same time, the work of Sun Tzu analyzed counterinsurgency, but focusing more on 
intelligence and deception as the core concepts of every war.  Sun Tzu devotes attention to strategies preceding 
the actual fighting, ranging from military preparations to diplomatic actions (Handel, 2005). For Sun Tzu, 
strategic superiority will result in tactical success (Sun Tzu, 1986). A strong diplomatic strategy and a well-
functioning economy, points emphasized by Sun Tzu, are of course of central importance in winning a war. This 
is especially true nowadays, where scientific advancements and technological innovations, as well as the 
production and distribution of aliment, fuel, and weapons, are just as important as tactical battlefield success for 
winning a war (Handel, 2005 ). Regarding this more comprehensive level of analysis, the thinking of Sun Tzu is 
indeed more relevant to contemporary war. 
Sun Tzu’s numeric superiority thinking was extremely apparent in China’s strategy during the Korean 
War (1950-53), where tactical success was supposed to be generated by simply outnumbering the US-led UN 
troops (Freedmann, 2001). In addition, this type of strategy characterized the post-World War II strategy of the 
USSR. The Soviets drastically outnumbered NATO troops in regard to conventional war machinery. This 
situation influenced President Eisenhower’s decision to “abandon the attempt to compete in conventional 
strength and capitalize instead on the growing nuclear arsenal of the United States” (Freedmann, 2001). It is 




Bartley, C.M. (2005),“The Art of Terrorism: What Sun Tzu can teach us about International Terrorism”, 
Comparative Strategy, 24 (3) 
Coker, C, (2003) ‘What would Sun Tzu say about the war on terrorism?’, RUSI Journal, Vol. 148(1) 
Freedmann, L. (2001) The Cold War – A military History. London, Casell and Co. 
Handel, M.  (1996), Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, New York: Frank Cass 
Kane, T. (2007). Ancient China on post Modern War. London, Routledge 
McCready, D. M.(2003) Learning from Sun Tzu, Parameters Press 
Sun Tzu, (1986) The Art of War, translated by L. Giles, USA, Inkstone Book 
Clausewitz, C.V. (1976). On War. M. Howard., and P. Paret (eds. And trans.) Princeton, N.J: Princeton 
University Press 
Handel, I.M. (1991). Sun Tzu and Clausewitz Compared. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute 
Sawyer, D.R. (1996). The Complete Art of War: Sun Tzu. Colorado: Westview Press. 
Titus, U. M. (2016). “Domestic Terrorism and its Impacts on Nigerian State: An Analysis of Boko Haram 
Insurgency”, International Journal of Innovative Research and Studies, Vol. 15, Issue (1), pp. 164-194. 
Clausewitz, C.V. (1984). On War. Michael Howert and Peter Paret (Eds.) Princeton, N.J: Princeton University 
Press. 
Wendell, C. (1986). “Clausewitz’s Theory of War: An Alternative View”. Comparative Strategy, Vol. 5, No. 4. 
